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ABSTRACT 
Most studies of differentiated integration are confined within the framework of 
the European Union (EU). The EU-Balkan relationship provides an opportunity 
to apply differentiated integration to links between the EU and a cluster of 
external states. Differentiated integration is at play in the relationship between 
the EU and the Balkans, especially in terms of time and space. Different states, 
at different times, have entered into binding contractual agreements with the 
EU, intended to enhance their ‘European perspective’. Objectives are 
seemingly common, there is a sequencing of commitments, and territorially we 
seek to prepare states so we can redraw our boundaries and include them 
within. Functionally differentiated integration as a concept faces a greater 
challenge as the Balkans are not part of the EU. Variable geometry and á la 
carte choices are not readily available to the Balkan states and as such their fate 
is decided by the existing membership and not by their own choices. 
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The politics of differentiated integration: the case of the 
Balkans 
 
1. Introduction 
Most studies of differentiated integration are confined within the framework of 
the European Union (EU), the relationships between existing Member-States, 
and various institutional arrangements. The relationship between the EU and 
the Balkans provides an opportunity to explore the possibility of applying the 
concept of differentiated integration to a set of links between the EU and a 
nominal cluster of external states. 
If differentiated integration has any relevance to the EU/Balkan relationship, or 
in the Balkans itself, three key points need to be made. First, differentiated 
integration in the Balkans results from the interests and policy preferences of 
the existing EU members. Balkan states, if given the option, would chose 
immediate and full membership of the EU, they would not willingly adopt 
polices of differentiated integration. If part of the accepted definition of 
differentiated integration is, ‘the process whereby European states … opt to 
move at different speeds’, in the case of the Balkans it should be amended to 
read, ‘the process whereby European states … opt for other (non-EU) states to 
move at different speeds’ towards European integration. The range and depth 
of EU involvement in the Balkans has been such since 1991, that it could be 
said that there has been an imposition of differentiated integration on the region 
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by the EU. 
Second, if differentiated integration in the Balkans is to be cast in the context of 
enlargement, we then have to emphasise the essentially political nature of this 
process. In other words, there is very little that is technical or functional in the 
EU’s decisions to treat the Balkans through a process of differentiated 
integration. Differentiated integration is a direct manifestation of political 
strategies for managing a range of so-called Balkan problems – ethnic rivalries, 
irredentism, separatism, war, democratisation, institution building. This 
complex set of problems in the Balkans, in conjunction with the range of 
interests of EU members and the lack of applicable instruments in the EU, has 
been the cause of differentiated integration.  
Third, is the EU’s insistence of treating the Balkans as a region. There are 
historical and psychological reasons why this is the case: some of them 
emanating from Yugoslavia’ wars of disintegration, others from the more 
distant past; some real and some perceived. Differentiated integration in this 
regionalist context has two implications. On the one hand, the Balkans are 
treated differently from other European regions in the course of European 
enlargement. On the other hand, even though there is, as we shall see, a great 
raft of regionalism embedded in the EU’s Balkans policies, the EU 
differentiates between parts of the Balkans in terms of integration. In effect, we 
have a double differentiation which is a key component to understanding the 
location of the Balkans in the EU’s orbit. 
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This paper will examine the concept of differentiated integration, in the context 
of the widening of the EU, through the specific lens of the relationship between 
the Union and the region commonly referred to as the Balkans. The Balkans 
have thrown up a series of geo-strategic; politic-economic and socio-cultural 
challenges to the EU since the early 1990s. As a result, the EU has had to 
formulate and implement a wide range of policies at different times, aimed at 
different territories (and types of territories), in attempting to meet those 
challenges.   
The paper initially will look at the context of the EU/Balkan relationship and 
trace the origins of the need for a policy of differentiated integration. It will be 
argued that even though there is a public perception and portrayal of the 
Balkans as one region – the result of historical developments – the EU’s 
regional approach is based on a diversity of Balkans lumped under one 
heading. Following on from this, the paper will consider the EU/Balkan 
relationship through the context of widening and examine the actual policies of 
the EU towards the region focusing on the Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe, the Stabilisation and Association Process and ultimately the 
enlargement process proper. There seems to be no better evidence of 
differentiated integration than this mix of policies which draw individual 
members of the Balkans towards the EU at different speeds. The regionalism 
element will also be examined to evaluate to what extent a functional form of 
integration has taken root in the Balkans: is this regional approach realistic and 
does it serve the interests of the EU rather than those of Balkans states? The 
  4 
tentative conclusions to be reached are that differentiated integration is at play 
in the Balkans, especially in temporal and spatial terms, but that the concept of 
differentiated integration can only be valid in this region if it is accepted that it 
can take place beyond the borders of the EU. 
 
2. Context 
EU policy towards the Balkans is framed by two essential spatial questions. 
What is the territory we are involved with (what is/are the Balkans)? Where do 
we want our own (EU) territorial limits to be? These questions are important 
for two reasons. First, the EU formulates policies which address Balkan states 
as a territorial cluster and urges these states to adopt and promote regional co-
operation as a key step in their ‘European perspective’, while simultaneously 
differentiating between states in their approach to candidacy or prospective 
membership of the EU. 
Second, this policy of differentiated integration results both from perceived 
differences between Balkan states and an upsurge in the debate within existing 
EU members as to the limits of Europe and EU enlargement. If indeed the EU 
is trying to build states in the Balkans, tie them together regionally, both at the 
inter-state and transnational levels, and transcend ethnic and national rifts to 
bring them closer to the European mainstream, these are being undermined by 
European hostility to further enlargement, especially as it is partly based on 
issues of identity and religion.  
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What has to be addressed is how exactly have the Balkans been viewed in 
terms of identity and territory by Europe and what effect does this have on  the 
further widening and deepening of the European project. This is a crucial issue 
in establishing how and why differentiated integration is occurring in the 
Balkans and whether the Balkans, as a whole, are being treated in a radically 
different way to other aspiring members of the EU.  
Ideationally, the Balkans have proved an easy target for western Europe. From 
the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand to the violent collapse of 
Yugoslavia, modern Balkan history is easily condemnable. The phrases 
‘Balkan powder keg’ or ‘cockpit of Europe’s wars’ are readily trotted out, 
almost caricaturing of the region’s politics. The long-term western perception 
of the Balkans is not only of a troubled region but also an alien one in 
European terms. An imposter in Europe’s midst; geographically in Europe but 
in attitudes and actions not of Europe. Some dispute this strongly, arguing that 
in fact what has been created in western minds is ‘an imagined Balkans’. 
(Todorova, 1997). What is real is that the Balkans and its inhabitants stir upset, 
negative reactions in European circles, and the events of the 1990s simply 
served to reinforce them.  
How does this translate into a contemporary understanding and appreciation of 
what the Balkans are, and more specifically what impact has it had on EU 
policies towards the region? To put it differently, to what extent have these 
negative attitudes, built on a series of historical perceptions, influenced how the 
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EU had involved itself in the Balkans?1 Clearly, the answer is enormously; 
especially as a result of the breakdown of Yugoslavia, the most recent ‘round’ 
in the development of the Balkans international personality.  
As federal Yugoslavia descended into bloody conflict, ethnic cleansing and 
genocide, Europe was going through a different and equally radical 
transformation. In the East, the collapse of communism and the path towards 
democratisation was in the main peacefully conducted (and celebrated as such). 
Significant change was also occurring in the West: the European project 
continued apace with the finalisation of the Maastricht Treaty and the creation 
of the EU. What this indicated in grand terms was the recreation of Europe. 
This was not only a spatial or territorial recreation, but also cultural and 
ideological in that ‘Europeanness’ and its norms and democratic ideals were 
winning out over alternative models of political-economic organisation.  On the 
surface of it, the nation-state was also being overwhelmed by this tide of 
change. The European project, in its universalist mode, was rendering the 
nation-state, and its historical legacies, unimportant if not redundant in some 
cases. The end of communism in the East did lead to the re-emergence of 
certain nationalisms and the reassertion of ethnic identity in some states. But 
this was deemed of secondary importance and certainly bowed to the power of 
democratic values and systems and the reconstitution of a European space 
which was seemingly built on these. 
                                                 
1
 This should help us understand the roots of differentiated integration by the EU towards the region as 
a whole and not necessarily between states in the region. 
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At the same time, this euphoria – and occasionally self-satisfaction – was being 
confronted and undermined by a European war being waged in a space 
bordering both East and West Europe. It was difficult to understand how this 
could be. The easy retort was to return to the explanation of the ‘imagined 
Balkans’; a stereotyped response explaining away Yugoslavia’s wars based on 
old assumptions about a very ‘un-European’ part of the continent (Kaplan, 
1993). Consequently, Europe’s attitudes to the Balkans were conditioned by the 
reactions to Yugoslavia’s wars of dissolution (and these reactions were for the 
most part not very sophisticated). 
‘The Balkans’ became a catch-all and pejorative term for a region whose core 
was at war. As conflict engulfed Yugoslavia, the rest of the region was 
perceived to be heading the same way, wrought by the same age-old 
animosities which were seen as responsible for provoking war in the federation. 
The war in Yugoslavia was seen as a Balkan War, (Glenny, 1993) the area 
became a problem area as a whole. Some studies tackling the Balkans as a 
region, at the time, made a strong argument for regional policies based on the 
similarity of problems and differences as a binding agent (Economides, 1992). 
The main reason for the confusion of attitudes, and the conflation of 
Yugoslavia and the Balkans, was the lack of a distinction between the geo-
strategic threats or consequences of Yugoslavia’s disintegration and the socio-
cultural issues underpinning potential regional unrest. The mainstream view 
had it that Yugoslavia’s wars – and hence the essence of Balkan politics – were 
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a nationalist struggle, pitting one ethnic group against another (an anachronism 
in the world of advanced European integration in the West and increasingly so 
in a democratising East). Two points arise here. First, Yugoslavia’s problems at 
this level were not the problems of the Balkans as a whole. Romania and 
Bulgaria, for example, were not held captive by ethnic issues in the same way 
as Yugoslavia’s republics, nor were there own potential flashpoints considered 
as volatile. Second, and equally importantly there is an extremely convincing 
argument that Yugoslavia’ demise was not attributable to a simple formula of 
nationalism and ethnic rivalries, but a much more subtle and complex interplay 
of economic, political and constitutional issues which had to be evaluated both 
in a domestic and international context (Woodward, 1995). 
Therefore, from 1991, the causes and consequences of Yugoslavia’s breakdown 
were considered Balkan problems and a de facto, and negative, regionalism 
was the general perception of the EU towards the Balkans. Unable to reach 
consensus on what action to take, and lacking strong instruments of persuasion 
if not coercion, the EU quickly settled for a policy of containment. This was a 
containment of war, refugees and economic migrants, spanning the whole 
region. And it was the dominant EU policy towards the Balkans until well into 
the second half of the decade. It could be argued that this was the beginning of 
a particular policy of differentiated integration, one of keeping the Balkan 
states out of the EU (unlike the Central and Eastern European [CEE] states 
which were being drawn in much more quickly). It was only after the end of 
the war in Bosnia (December 1995) that some Balkan states – Slovenia, 
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Romania and Bulgaria – entered into association agreements with the EU, and 
subsequently began accession negotiations. And what bound the Balkans 
together was an external perception of what they shared in common, rather than 
an internally generated belief in common interests and goals based on some 
kind of geographical and cultural bond.  
The second aspect of this regionalism was the realisation in western European 
circles that indeed the term Balkans had taken on such negative connotations 
that it had become an unhelpful. As a consequence, the term Southeastern 
Europe (SEE) supplanted the Balkans in the language of the EU. In this new 
regional context, the EU found it easier to initiate separate sets of relations with 
separate states and groups of states in the region. The Eastern Balkans, that is 
Romania and Bulgaria, were granted their own distinct route to EU 
membership. Romania ad Bulgaria applied for EU membership in December 
1995, the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 issued a 
favourable avis and negotiations for full membership began in early 2000.2 
Slovenia too had followed a different path following its split from federal 
Yugoslavia and its approaches to the EU were viewed much more favourably 
both because of its ability to meet accession criteria and the acquis but also 
because of strong support from within the EU, (despite strong Italian 
objections), and the general belief that this was a central European state and not 
a Balkan one (Gow and Carmichael, 2000). 
                                                 
2
 This is illustrative of the politics of the decision. The lag between the favourable avis and the start of 
negotiations is attributable to the fact that while for political and strategic reasons the EU wished to 
encourage Romania and Bulgaria, in real terms they could not meet the accession criteria in the short-
term. 
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In fact, what we have progressively throughout the late 1990s and beyond is a 
shrinking region. The Balkans, which to many is a fictitious region, is being 
broken down into more basic elements. By the end of the crisis in Kosovo we 
moved firmly from a general Balkan region, or that of Southeastern Europe, to 
a very specific policy relevant region known as the Western Balkans (WB). 
The formulaic, ‘the WB is the states of former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia and 
plus Albania’ became a mantra among EU officials dealing with SEE. In 
reality, the WB became the Balkans in terms of the EU and in terms of our 
concern with differentiated integration (Delevic, 2007). 
Therefore in spatial terms, the ‘region’ we are dealing with is a state cluster 
currently known as the Western Balkans. It consists mainly of states created 
from the remnants of federal Yugoslavia, united under the rubric of WB to 
differentiate then from Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia which progressed to 
EU membership much more quickly (if not always smoothly in the case of the 
first two). The logic of the cluster is that these are ‘problem’ states which have 
a long way to go before realistically being able to apply for full membership of 
the EU. As will be shown in the next section, different states in the WB are on 
different trajectories to EU membership and a variety of initiatives 
implemented by the EU are at play with respect to the WB. A key initiative is 
the EU’s Regional Approach which pushes the WB states into forms of 
regional co-operation which are have to be met if they wish to pursue further, 
and deeper, contractual relations with the EU. So the WB region is not one 
which shares natural regional characteristics either in terms of identity, culture 
  11 
or politico-economic development. Albania is different to Croatia which is 
different to FYROM under all these categories. What binds these states 
together in regional terms are geographical proximity, a common and troubled 
recent history, late post-communist development politically and economically, 
and most importantly the EU policy of binding them together. Territorially the 
EU defines the WB partly on the grounds of location and proximity but mainly 
on a troubled recent past. There may be economies of scope to be gained by 
regional economic initiatives, even though this is in question (Delevic, 2007, 
pp. 13-14), but the regionalism promoted by the EU is based primarily on 
getting ‘hostile’ states to co-operate while their entry to the EU is held off for a 
variety of reasons. 
Which leads to the second spatial issue raised at the beginning of this section, 
namely that of where do Europeans wish to see Europe’s borders; where does 
enlargement stop? This is crucial for the concept of differentiated integration in 
its spatial dimension with respect to the Balkans. The WB countries have, for 
some time, seen both the EU accession of other (non-WB) SEE states, and the 
EU’s insistence on regional co-operation as indications that their prospects of 
accession are dim. Why haven’t they been offered fast-track entry to the EU as 
a way of speeding up reform and introducing EU membership as conflict-
resolution mechanism? Is the insistence of regional co-operation a means by 
which to speed up the move towards the EU or a vehicle for constructing a 
form of regional integration which will act as a substitute to EU enlargement 
(albeit with preferential sectoral agreements with the EU)? Of course, these 
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fears multiply as the EU proposes a series of new forms of contractual 
arrangements for the WB, short of accession agreements. And finally, the 
European future of the WB is entangled in a broader EU debate about the 
merits of further enlargement. The Balkan caricature of the early 1990s remains 
firmly embedded in western European perceptions. Serbia’s European future 
has been hampered not by the inability to meet technical aspects of the acquis, 
but because of the normative concern with the unwillingness to co-operate with 
ICTY on the arrest of indicted war criminals; a throwback to the violence of 
Yugoslavia’s collapse which has come to characterise the Balkans. 
Therefore, the spatial dimension of differentiated integration is influenced by 
these two features: one relating to our understanding of the Balkans and one to 
our vision of the territorial limits of European integration. In real terms, as 
mentioned above, what there was of the Balkans has been shrinking. What 
remains is a rump SEE commonly referred to as the WB which is the locus of 
the EU’s policies of differentiated integration. In the ensuing section, I will 
highlight how the Balkans have shrunk as a result of EU policies, examine 
polices developed by the EU for the SEE and WB, and argue that indeed the 
temporal aspect of differentiated integration is a key feature of EU policy in the 
region. 
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3. From Southeastern Europe to the Western Balkans 
 
There is a view suggesting that there have been too many EU polices towards 
the countries of the Balkans since the mid-1990s, indeed that the region has 
been suffering from ‘initiative-itis’. Roughly speaking, these initiatives have 
three objectives for the purposes of this paper: reconstruction, state-and 
institution-building, and EU membership itself. Ostensibly, the Commission 
has applied a variety of tools in implementing these initiatives with a view to 
promoting membership of the EU for all SEE states. In practice, these types of 
initiatives have been at play simultaneously, and while some states such as 
Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia (and potentially Croatia which is a candidate 
country alongside FYROM) have achieved membership through a traditional 
route, the remaining Balkans states have been faced with the prospect of a 
variety of different policies and agreements before they can finally reach the 
Holy Grail of Europe Agreements and entry negotiations.  
For the WB states, for example, European Partnerships and Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements (SAA) are stepping stones on the path to potential 
candidacy of the EU. The EU has differentiated between these states and others 
in SEE and beyond. As mentioned in the previous section this has resulted in a 
form of spatial differentiation in integration terms, where the WB is lagging 
behind other parts of SEE in accession terms. A new territorial cluster – a 
European space – has been created as a result and it is the object of substantial 
EU policy. In turn this has also created a specific timeline or temporal 
  14 
differentiation in integration terms, where some states are moving towards 
potential (and actual) EU accession more rapidly and steadily than others.  
On the surface, this agrees with Goetz’s observation about temporally 
differentiated integration which ‘differs from “variable geometry” and an á la 
carte approach in that it does not question common objectives’, (Goetz, 2009) 
it allows some to move ahead more quickly than others while goals remain the 
same. Here, the common goal is EU membership: all SEE states want this; 
some have and will achieve it earlier than others. This, we are constantly 
reminded by the Commission, is the stated intention of the EU as confirmed by 
the Thessaloniki Agenda and the instruments employed to fulfil it 
(Thessaloniki Agenda, 2003). The most often used analogy to describe the 
process of enlargement to WB is that of a ‘regatta not a convoy’: there is a 
defined finishing line towards which all are striving but some will get there 
sooner than others. What is not developed in this analogy is the fact that some 
of the contestants in the regatta may fall foul of the rules or run into inclement 
weather, or more importantly that the rules of the regatta may be changed and 
further legs be added to it lengthening the run to the finishing line (The 
Economist, 2006). This is what many see as the evolving EU policy towards 
WB. While some states have progressed to EU membership through the 
established route of Europe Agreements, entry negotiations and ultimately 
accession, the WB are being asked to negotiate and adhere to a series of ‘pre-
agreements’, before they can contemplate applying for full membership. Some 
see this as obstructionist tactics, others see it a more permanent obstacle to EU 
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membership. Either way what it does is enhance the notion of spatially 
differentiated integration and create a parallel process of temporally defined 
differentiated integration. 
 
4. Objectives, Policies and Instruments 
 
4.1. Objectives 
As indicated above, EU policy towards SEE has been defined by three major 
objectives: reconstruction; state and institution-building; and EU membership. 
Logically, states would sequentially move through these three phases and 
become full members of the Union. In SEE, these three processes have been 
occurring simultaneously since the mid-1990s. Before analysing and 
illustrating the policies used to achieve these objectives – and the timing – we 
briefly need to explain these three processes. 
Reconstruction in the Balkan context is fundamentally important for two 
obvious reasons. The first is the common reason shared by all post-communist 
states in Europe; the consequences of 40+ years of economic stagnation. The 
reconstruction of devastated economies had every little to do with pre-
accession economic assistance. It was an attempt to provide basic economic 
remedies to long term economic ills and provide some kind of foundation for 
states to begin a process of transition. That the states of SEE were seen to lag 
behind the CEE countries in terms of economic development even during the 
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communist era simply highlights the lower starting threshold they had to deal 
with in the process of transition. But, SEE also had to contend with the 
consequences of war in Yugoslavia. In this sense reconstruction was both 
physical and ‘economic’. That is, funds and time were devoted to the physical 
reconstruction of infrastructure and plant destroyed during Yugoslavia’s wars 
or to which the delay of decay and degradation had proved impossible because 
of the war. And the physical effects of Yugoslavia’s wars were felt regionally 
as any intra-regional trade ceased; routine maintenance of infrastructure proved 
difficult and international trade embargoes and sanction affected all states in 
the region. The most relevant of the EU’s initiatives in this field was the 
Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe launched in 1999. 
State and institution-building, in this context, refers to something different than 
simply preparation for entry negotiations. Perhaps one could term it 
democratisation, in which a majority of SEE states took a longer time to 
commence a process of political transition. The state had to be readied 
politically and institutionally before the process of candidacy – let alone 
accession – could begin. Whether it be reform of the judicial system in Croatia, 
the handing over of indicted war criminals to ICTY in Serbia (and other SEE 
states), or the reduction of corruption and criminality (an ongoing issue in 
Romania and Bulgaria despite their accession), these are all normative and well 
as functional issues which have to be dealt with before EU membership can be 
considered. This is not ‘a new form of polity-building’ through European 
integration, (Keating, 2009) but the establishment – and acceptance – of certain 
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ground rules and institutions before integration can take place. So in a sense 
this is democratisation for the sake of democratisation as an ideal, rather than 
strictly speaking democratisation for the purposes of immediate accession to 
the EU. Here, the best example of the tool used to promote this policy is that of 
the SAA, which does hold out, as an incentive for reform, the possibility of 
candidacy for membership, as well as significant economic assistance, but no 
guarantees and much conditionality. 
Lastly, we have the actual accession or EU membership, from which Slovenia, 
Romania and Bulgaria have benefited. This is the easiest to define, and 
illustrate. Certain states were deemed ready for accession negotiations and 
ultimately membership by the EU. Having fulfilled the required criteria and 
adopted the acquis they were inducted into the club. For Slovenia, as will be 
shown later this was a relatively swift process, for Romania and Bulgaria, 
rather more drawn out. What is more relevant for us in this context is why these 
states were propelled down a different path form others in SEE and what does 
this tell us about differentiated integration? 
 
4.2. Policies and Instruments 
The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP) was agreed at the Cologne 
European Council in June 1999 and launched, symbolically, in Sarajevo at the 
end of July. It was an EU initiative drawing together 28 states and 17 
International Financial Institutions and other international organisations, 
  18 
intending to ‘develop a shared strategy for stability and growth of the region … 
and to accelerate democratic and economic development in the region’ (SCSP 
Constituent Document, 1999). 3 It was the first time in a decade that the EU 
launched a proactive policy towards the Balkans and it was meant to provide a 
focal point to its strategy towards the region. The regional approach was a key 
element, and the SP focused on the SEE as a whole, including Romania and 
Bulgaria who were about to begin their accession negotiations with the EU. 
The regional emphasis is made more acute by the fact that the Pact was 
succeeded in February 2008, by the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC). 
While the initial objectives of the pact were laudably high, including 
democratisation, human rights and security issues, as well as providing the 
region with an interim stepping stone on the path towards ‘Euro-Atlantic 
integration’, most of its activities were centred on reconstruction and the jump-
starting of economic development. The first donor conference held by the SP, 
in March 2000, saw the launch of the ‘Quick Start’ programme which invited 
donors to concentrate their funding on 35 schemes, the vast majority of which 
were infrastructure projects.  And it was in this policy area that the SP would 
concentrate most of its activities. In essence, the SP was proceeding along the 
path of economic reconstruction as the foundation for economic growth and 
development which was the hallmark of all development efforts in Europe post-
1945. It was based on the classic model of the Marshall Plan. External donors 
                                                 
3
 As an EU initiative, the SP Special Co-ordinator was appointed by the EU, and the Commission 
played the leading role in developing strategy and co-ordinating fundraising. 
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would provide the funding to reconstruct devastated economies and prime 
economic growth which would become the bedrock of regional stability.  
The other activities of the SP, convened by the Working Tables on 
Democratisation and Human Rights, and Security Issues, took a back seat to 
the priority of fulfilling the needs of economic reconstruction. The other key 
policy of the Pact relevant to this paper is that by joining the SP countries 
‘commit[ed] themselves (among other things) to bilateral and regional 
cooperation among themselves to advance their integration, on an individual 
basis, into Euro-Atlantic structures’ (SCSP Constituent Document, 1999). This 
was a clear indication that participation in this EU regional initiative was 
considered an important step towards EU integration for all SEE states (each at 
their own speed). So while the Quick Start, and later the Near Start, packages 
concentrated the work of the SP on economic reconstruction and development, 
the more political elements of the Pact were pursued under different Working 
Tables, all under the auspices of promoting the European potential of the 
region.  
The end of the Kosovo intervention in June 1999 made it clear that the EU 
could now launch a proactive, civilian, policy towards SEE (Friis and Murphy, 
2000). This brought into sharp relief the fact that progress towards EU 
membership from countries in the region could only be achieved if staggered 
and that it would be a lengthy – and costly – process. Romania and Bulgaria, 
even though members of the Pact, were pursuing their own path to membership 
  20 
and were participating to enhance their own chances of securing early 
accession. The SP thus became the initial forum for the EU’s attempts to deal 
with the economic and political reconstruction and development of what 
became known as the WB. While the situation in Kosovo was still tense and 
Milosevic remained in power in Serbia, little could be done to put the EU-
Balkan relationship on a sounder footing. Serbia would have to be part of any 
regional arrangement for it to be viable, incentives would have to be offered to 
the Serbian people to encourage them in their reforms, but this was impossible 
with Milosevic still in power. Similarly other WB states would either refuse to 
participate while Milosevic was still in power or, as with Croatia, believed they 
were being held back under the SP which simply did not offer them enough in 
their transition process. In short, the policy of reconstructing and sparking the 
economic recovery and development of SEE on a regional basis, and thus 
promoting its European perspective was weakened by Balkan politics, and by 
the built–in proviso that each state should and could pursue its European future 
at its own pace. By the time Milosevic fell from power in October 2000, the SP 
was displaced, not replaced, by a new programme, the Stabilisation and 
Association Process (SAP) which was more binding and dealt with issues far 
beyond those tackled in the SP. While it had a significant regional dimension to 
it, its essence was a prospective contractual relationship between the EU and 
individual WB states. The Balkans would now shrink from SEE to WB. 
The SAP was instituted during a summit held in Zagreb in November 2000. 
Present were the heads of state/government of the EU and the states of the WB 
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(plus Slovenia and various High Representatives of the EU). On one level it 
built on the Regional Approach, announced by the EU in 1997, which was 
mainly a declaratory policy in the aftermath of Yugoslavia’s wars laying the 
groundwork for further initiatives such as the SP. Apart from regional co-
operation the other two stated aims of the SAP are ‘stabilisation and a swift 
transition to a market economy’ and ‘the promotion… of the prospect of EU 
accession’. The aim of the SAP was to move beyond reconstruction and target 
the WB states for a specific kind of partnership with the EU where there would 
be reciprocal responsibilities. The EU would offer increasingly closer ties 
backed up by substantial financial and technical support, and preferential 
agreements, with the ‘prospect of EU accession’ as a non-binding possibility. 
In return, the WB states would have to carry out extensive reforms, fulfil 
conditionalities, participate in regional co-operation and conform to European 
and international standards of behaviour. The contractual agreement at the heart 
of the arrangement was the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). To 
help achieve an SAA, the EU was committed to financial assistance to the WB 
through the CARDS programme,4 while preferential trade agreements would 
flow from the signing of an SAA. 
The first two signatories of SAA’s were FYROM in April 2001 and Croatia in 
October of the same year.5 While the WB appreciated the novelty of the EU’s 
policy, the SAP was seen mainly as a source of financial assistance and 
                                                 
4
 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation. CARDS pledged €4.6 
Billion between 2000-2006 to achieve its objectives. 
5
 In both cases they took a long time to come into force, FYROM in 2004 and Croatia in 2005. 
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predominantly as a substitute to the ‘Europe Agreements’ reached by previous 
prospective EU members (Phinnemore, 2003). In short, the SAP was seen as a 
way of short-circuiting the accession process, but this is not what the EU had in 
mind. It became clear that expectations were not being met as states like 
Bosnia, Serbia and Albania were nowhere near signing SAA’s, and indeed that 
the SAP was designed as precursor to the accession process rather than as a 
substitute process.  
The EU, spurred on by the Greek presidency in the first semester of 2003 and 
‘Big Bang’ enlargement, moved to add definition to the SAP, ‘enrich’ it in the 
language of the Commission, and introduce new instruments. This could be 
taken as an example of the ‘initiative-itis’ referred to earlier, or an indication 
that the EU was increasingly concerned with inability of certain WB states to 
progress along the SAP. The reform process was not seen to be working in the 
WB and the WB states were unhappy with their status. But while the 
Thessaloniki Agenda did add depth and new tools to the SAP, primarily by 
reinforcing the region’s ‘European perspective’ and prospects for membership, 
but also by adding an EU-WB consultative forum and beefing up financial 
assistance commitments through a new Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA) it did nothing to prevent the reality (and perception) of a 
process of differentiated integration. In one sense differentiated integration was 
taking place as FYROM and Croatia moved ahead of the rest of the WB pack 
by becoming candidate countries. And in another sense the remaining WB 
countries perceived that the new ‘Europe Partnerships’, a new step in the SAP 
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created by Thessaloniki, were a further obstacle rather than boost to their 
European prospects: they were being pushed further away from the EU rather 
than entering into a closer embrace. This was differentiated integration of a 
different sort, not only were some WB countries moving ahead, others were 
seemingly being obstructed from the EU. 
More recently, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia have 
all signed SAA’s and even Kosovo has a Europe Partnership and has 
established an ‘SAP-Tracking mechanism’. Differentiated integration is an 
obvious phenomenon in this process. Either it occurs by design, where 
countries such as Croatia move ahead with their reform processes and fulfil the 
conditions set out by the EU through the SAP – with the backing of existing 
members of the EU. Or it does not occur at all, either by design or by default. 
In the first case, Serbia was prevented from signing an SAA primarily because 
of its unwillingness to meet basic conditions set by the EU, in this instance the 
arrest and extradition of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic to the ICTY in 
the Hague. Or, in the second case where Albania, for a number of years simply 
could not meet the criteria set out by the EU because of institutional and other 
weaknesses. 
The Accession process is the most obvious of the policies which the EU has 
employed in the region. But in fact it is not a regional policy. While the EU 
held out the prospect of candidate status to all SEE countries, encouraging 
regional co-operation as a pre-condition, enlargement has taken place on a 
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piecemeal basis (and it has worn away the Balkans and hence regionalism with 
it). Slovenia’s accession as part of the 10, in 2003, is a well documented 
process, facilitated by the fact that its own regional aspirations lay in Central 
rather than Southeastern Europe. As a result it was not moved, or forced to 
participate in regional initiatives to the extent that others have been (even 
though it was part of the Stability Pact). Slovenia applied for membership and 
according to a well worn formula was granted candidate status 1997 and began 
entry negotiations in 1998. Romania and Bulgaria, though never required to 
participate in the SAP, were full members of the SP and play a full role in the 
regional initiatives of the EU and other organisations (outlined in the next 
section). Their path to accession has been slightly more erratic, as negotiations 
stuck over the inability of the two states to carry out necessary reforms on time, 
and they joined the EU in January 2007, after over 6 years of tough 
negotiations. There are still outstanding issues and the Commission has had to 
take punitive action against both states in the recent past. 
Croatia has been a candidate country since June 2004 and began its accession 
negotiations in October 2005.6 Similarly, FYROM was granted candidate status 
in December 2005 but the EU has been unwilling to begin accession 
negotiations as it views the lack of progress in meeting accession criteria as a 
serious obstacle. Therefore, we have various tiers of countries which all enjoy 
different levels of contractual relationships with the EU which have occurred in 
different timeframes. Both in terms of space and time it is clearly evident that 
                                                 
6
 The cause of the delay in Croatia’s accession negotiations was due to the condition laid down by the 
EU that the talks would not commence until General Ante Gotovina, indicted by ICTY, was in custody.  
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differentiated integration is taking place in the Balkan context. Different parts 
of the region are moving closer to EU membership (or have achieved 
membership) at different times. The region is being redefined by the policies of 
the EU and the ‘regatta’ towards accession. SEE has become the WB, and that 
could be eroded in the near future. Yet, as is examined in the final section, the 
EU insists on treating ‘the Balkans’ as a region by promoting regional co-
operation as a key facet of the Balkan country’s ‘European perspective’. It 
seems from the above that the Balkans are no longer a region in spatial or 
temporal terms – at least not in its relations with the EU which seem to be all 
defining. What remains to be seen is whether through regional co-operation as 
demanded by the EU there is any form of functional integration which gives the 
region meaning. 
 
5. Regionalism 
SEE has been the object of a bewildering variety of regional initiatives since 
the mid-1990s. The Royaumont Process, the Southeast Europe Cooperation 
Initiative (SECI) and the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) 
are three examples of such initiatives. In addition to these various SEE states 
participate in the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), the Central 
European Initiative (CEI), Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the 
rather more obscure Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, which extend beyond the region. 
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Of relevance to us, we also have the EU sponsored or inspired regional 
initiatives. 
These have been outlined in previous sections and stem from the Regional 
Approach declared by the EU in 1997 and stating the EU’s view that peace and 
stability in the Balkans could only be achieved with extensive regional co-
operation. It was a political scheme which was subsequently developed in the 
SP and became a cornerstone of the SAP. In the latter, regional co-operation 
became a necessity for SEE and particularly the WB. It was no longer a 
practice encouraged by the EU, in the spirit of good-neighbourliness that had 
been developed in the Copenhagen criteria, but a must, a contractual condition 
upon which closer relations and ultimately EU membership would hinge. This 
was reemphasised by the Thessaloniki Agenda and the ensuing enrichment of 
the SAP with the Europe partnerships and the IPA, and features highly in all 
the progress reports issued by the Commission on each WB country’s European 
perspective. 
The underlying rationale of promoting regional cooperation, and laying it down 
as a principle of relations with the EU, is to engender better relations between 
the states and peoples of the region: ‘to encourage the countries of the region to 
behave towards each other and work with each other in a manner comparable to 
the relationships that now exist between EU Member States’ (Regional 
Approach, 1997). In practical terms, the EU has encouraged regional co-
operation in a series of sectors and spheres of activity. The most publicised and 
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well funded of these areas is that of trade where the EU has encouraged free 
trade agreements between countries in the region, and through the Autonomous 
Trade Measures which allow freer access to the EU market for regional goods 
(thus promoting greater EU-Balkan trade in regional terms). There has been an 
increase in regional co-operation in other sectors as well. Industrial co-
operation has been one of the few success stories in this regional effort, while 
in the domain of infrastructure provision and development the areas of 
transport and energy have been highlighted by the EU as important zones of 
activity. While there have been advances in co-operation over road and rail 
links, and the prospect of trans-border electricity grid-sharing and planned 
oil/gas pipelines is rich with promise, the record is rather thin. Where there has 
been greater success has been in areas where third (regional) parties have taken 
a greater stake and invested heavily in the market. For instance, Greece both an 
EU member and SEE, and a strong supporter in SEE integration into the EU, 
has been successfully active in the telecoms and banking sectors throughout 
SEE. Similarly, Turkey, and important regional actor and aspiring EU member 
is a key player in the energy sector as well as in many aspects of the retail 
sector. These actors, through acquisitions and investment and expansion 
throughout the region are a main driving force in the real embedding of 
regional co-operation as a motor both for regional interdependence and stability 
as well as enhancing the prospect of future EU membership. 
The reality is that the EU’s insistence on regional co-operation is undermined 
by a number of factors. First is that the key to understanding the EU promotion 
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of regional co-operation is to underpin regional stability. By paying lip service 
to this aspect of EU conditionality and participating in as wide range of 
regional initiatives as possible, regional states are claiming compliance with the 
EU’s expectations. Second, in real terms, it is difficult to see where the 
economics of regional co-operation are going to be successful. If there wasn’t a 
real regional market before the 1990s it is difficult to see what economic 
fundamentals have changed to think that a regional market can be created now. 
Third, while trade creation is a basic feature of regional co-operation and 
integration policies, the idea that individual WB states will join the EU when 
and if they can –and ahead of others – is a great incentive for trade diversion. 
Where better terms of trade can be achieved elsewhere to the detriment of 
regional co-operation and to the benefit of its European future, a country will 
follow that path. Fourth, some countries, for example Croatia, believe that 
regional co-operation is both a drag on their European prospects and are better 
off without it. There is also the widespread belief that the EU is fostering 
regional co-operation as a precursor to a formalised regional integration 
organisation which would substitute EU. Lastly, the evidence suggests that 
regional co-operation has only been successful when an economy outside the 
WB, and perhaps an EU member like Greece, has a deep interest and 
involvement in a particular sector within the region. 
For all these reasons, it is difficult to envisage the long-term success of the 
EU’s approach on regional co-operation. While attempting to create a spirit of 
unity, and in more practical terms a regional market and trade interdependence, 
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the overriding idea that EU accession can be achieved (and probably will be 
achieved) on a solitary basis is detrimental to regional co-operation.  
In terms of functional differentiation of integration this means a variety of 
different things. Using the typology developed by Kölliker (Kölliker, 2009), it 
could be argued that regional co-operation in SEE/WB conforms in at least two 
ways. First, there is a direct element of ‘conditional differentiation’. Second, 
there is also an element of ‘Directoire differentiation’. In both cases this is a 
result of the fact that the WB countries are not EU members and that EU 
membership will only be achievable when they have fulfilled the conditions 
laid in the contractual agreements signed with the EU, and/or when the existing 
members deem it appropriate for them to accede.  In effect their European 
future will be decided by the ‘ins’ based on their policy preferences and to a 
lesser extent on whether conditions have been fulfilled. 
 
6. Conclusion 
As we have seen, there is much evidence of differentiated integration at work 
in the Balkans, especially in the spatial and temporal dimensions. But it is 
equally clear that there are at least two major problems in applying the concept 
of differentiated integration to this region. First, is the problem of whether 
differentiated integration can be applied to a group of states or a territorial 
cluster beyond the borders of the EU. Second, is identifying exactly what this 
territorial cluster commonly referred to as the Balkans actually is.  
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In the first instance, there is strong case, with convincing evidence, that 
differentiated integration is at play in the relationship between the EU and the 
Balkans. This is especially true in terms of time and space. Different states, at 
different times, have entered into binding and deep-rooted contractual 
agreements with the EU which are all intended to enhance the ‘European 
perspective’ of these states and ultimately lead to membership of the Union. 
Objectives are seemingly common, there is a sequencing of commitments, and 
territorially we seek to prepare states so we can redraw our boundaries and 
include them within. Functionally differentiated integration as a concept faces a 
greater challenge by the fact that the Balkans are not part of the EU. Variable 
geometry and á la carte choices are not readily available to the Balkan states 
and as such their fate is decided by the existing membership and not by their 
own choices (apart from the fact that they have the choice to opt out of 
membership as a whole). They have a set menu with no choice.  
While it may be plausible to argue for the applicability of differentiated 
integration for the above reasons, the case is confused by the vagueness of the 
geographical region known as the Balkans. What I have argued is that the 
Balkans have in fact shrunk, as countries join the EU, and what is left, apart 
from the grander descriptive term of SEE, is a highly policy relevant region 
known as the WB. It is this cluster of states that is now the Balkans, it is partly 
the creation of the EU and it is what provokes attempts at regional co-operation 
both internally and externally. Whether it is a region, or can sustain meaningful 
regional co-operation in real terms is doubtful. Ultimately, it is the politics that 
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matter. In regional terms, WB governments and peoples make decisions about 
how they wish to relate to the EU, and whether they want to and can meet the 
conditions that will lead to EU accession. The biggest political decisions, 
nevertheless, are made by the existing EU members, according to their 
interests. It is their decisions about enlarging the Union which ultimately make 
differentiated integration a useful tool in examining the EU/Balkan 
relationship. 
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